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MISSING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY BOAT:
HOW TYNE v. TIME WARNER ENTERTAINMENT CO.
THREATENS TO "SINK" THE FIRST AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Tyne v. Time Warner Entertainment Co.1 ("Time v. Time Warner")
examined the delicate balance between the personal right of publicity and
the various rights of free expression granted under the First Amendment as
they pertain to real individuals depicted, sometimes inaccurately, in a
format that has come to be known as the "docudrama." 2 Tyne comes on the
heels of a number of high profile cases examining the right of publicity in
other similarly expressive contexts.3
In Tyne, a former crew member and the surviving family members of
individuals killed aboard a fishing vessel caught in a torrential storm 4 sued
the producers and distributors of the motion picture The Perfect Storm for
violations of Florida's right of publicity statute and for common law
invasion of privacy-specifically, false light and public disclosure of
private facts.5 The plaintiffs allege that these violations stem from
defendants depicting their lives and the lives and deaths of their deceased
1. 336 F.3d 1286 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
2. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 8:74 (2d ed. 2000).
3. See Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003) (holding that the depiction of
supernatural comic book characters half-worm and half-human resembling musicians, the Winter
Brothers, did not violate their right of publicity); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir.
2003) (holding that OutKast's rap song "Rosa Parks," violated her right of publicity); ETW Corp.
v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that an artist's print of Tiger Woods
did not violate Ohio's right of publicity statute); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 SW.3d 363 (Mo.
2003) (holding that an athlete's name used as a character in Todd McFarlane's comic book,
Spawn, was not protected by the First Amendment).
4. Erica Tyne and Billie-Jo Francis Tyne are the surviving children of decedent Billy Tyne.
Plaintiff Jodi Tyne is the former spouse of decedent Tyne. Plaintiff Dale R. Murphy, Jr. is the
surviving child of decedent Dale Murphy, Jr. Plaintiff, Debra Tigue, is the former spouse of
decedent Murphy. Plaintiff Douglas Kosco is a former crewmember of the Andrea Gail who
wisely withdrew from Tyne's crew just before the Andrea Gail's last voyage. Defendants'
Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Their Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment at
1-2, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286 (11 th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13281).
5. Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1288.
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family members without first seeking permission or compensating them in
any way.6 While the media is afforded broad immunity from publicity and
misappropriation claims for "public interest" publications,7 the use of an
individual's life story in entertainment without such permission remains a
particularly controversial and unsettled area of law.8
The district court in Tyne narrowly interpreted Florida's right of
publicity statute, section 540.08,9 concluding that it extended only to the
6. Id.
7. See discussion infra Part V(C).
8. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2.
9. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 540.08 (West Supp. 2001). Unauthorized publication of name or
likeness:
(1) No person shall publish, print, display or otherwise publicly use for purposes of
trade or for any commercial or advertising purpose the name, portrait, photograph,
or other likeness of any natural person without the express written or oral consent
to such use given by: (a) Such person; or (b) Any other person, firm or corporation
authorized in writing by such person to license the commercial use of her or his
name or likeness; or (c) If such person is deceased, any person, firm or corporation
authorized in writing to license the commercial use of her or his name or likeness,
or if no person, firm or corporation is so authorized, then by any one from among a
class composed of her or his surviving spouse and surviving children. (2) In the
event the consent required in subsection (1) is not obtained, the person whose
name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness is so used, or any person, firm, or
corporation authorized by such person in writing to license the commercial use of
her or his name or likeness, or, if the person whose likeness is used is deceased, any
person, firm, or corporation having the right to give such consent, as provided
hereinabove, may bring an action to enjoin such unauthorized publication, printing,
display or other public use, and to recover damages for any loss or injury sustained
by reason thereof, including an amount which would have been a reasonable
royalty, and punitive or exemplary damages. (3) The provisions of this section shall
not apply to: (a) The publication, printing, display, or use of the name or likeness of
any person in any newspaper, magazine, book, news broadcast or telecast, or other
news medium or publication as part of any bona fide news report or presentation
having a current and legitimate public interest and where such name or likeness is
not used for advertising purposes; (b) The use of such name, portrait, photograph,
or other likeness in connection with the resale or other distribution of literary,
musical, or artistic productions or other articles of merchandise or property where
such person has consented to the use of her or his name, portrait, photograph, or
likeness on or in connection with the initial sale or distribution thereof; or (c) Any
photograph of a person solely as a member of the public and where such person is
not named or otherwise identified in or in connection with the use of such
photograph. (4) No action shall be brought under this section by reason of any
publication, printing, display, or other public use of the name or likeness of a
person occurring after the expiration of 40 years from and after the death of such
person. (5) As used in this section, a person's "surviving spouse" is the person's
surviving spouse under the law of her or his domicile at the time of her or his death,
whether or not the spouse has later remarried; and a person's "children" are her or
his immediate offspring and any children legally adopted by the person. Any
consent provided for in subsection (1) shall be given on behalf of a minor by the
guardian of her or his person or by either parent. (6) The remedies provided for in
this section shall be in addition to and not in limitation of the remedies and rights of
any person under the common law against the invasion of her or his privacy.
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promotion of a product and not to the use of an individual's name or
likeness in an expressive medium.10 The court granted defendants'
summary judgment on both the fight of publicity claim and the common
law invasion of privacy claims." Appealing to the Eleventh Circuit,
plaintiffs asserted a statutory construction argument that would render the
term "commercial" in section 540.08(1) superfluous. 12 Confronted with this
innovative argument as to section 540.08's proper interpretation, as well as
the applicability of a remarkably similar Florida state appellate court
decision,' 3 the Eleventh Circuit certified the following question of law to
the Florida Supreme Court: "To what extent does Section 540.08 of the
Florida Statutes apply to the facts of this case?' 14 This Note analyzes this
issue and offers guidance to the Florida Supreme Court in resolving this
question.
Part II of this Note explores the history and the current state of the
right of publicity and common law invasion of privacy, both nationally and,
more importantly, in Florida. Part III reviews the facts underlying Tyne.
Part IV examines both the district court case and the Eleventh Circuit case
that led to the question of law that is currently before the Florida Supreme
Court. Part V critiques several statutory and constitutional arguments
offered by both parties. Finally, Part VI concludes that the district court's
original decision was correct in that Warner Bros. ("Warner") was not in
violation of section 540.08 when it produced and distributed a fictionalized
account of the lives and deaths of the fishermen tragically killed in New
England's so-called "perfect storm." This Note argues that ruling otherwise
would demean the First Amendment and would have dire legal
consequences for numerous forms of creative expression.
II. BACKGROUND-STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INVASION OF
PRIVACY IN FLORIDA
A. The Development of Invasion of Privacy as a Tort
The right of privacy is rooted in the common law and provides
individuals with the privilege to live a life free from unwarranted
10. Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1341 (M.D. Fla. 2002)
(adopting the Fourth District Court of Appeal's interpretation of § 540.08 in Loft v. Fuller, 408
So. 2d 619 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
11. Tyne, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1344.
12. Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1291.
13. See Loft, 408 So. 2d at 623.
14. Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1291.
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publicity.' 5 Thomas M. Cooley first described this right in his treatise on
torts as the right "to be let alone. 16 A decade later, the tort of invasion of
privacy became the subject of a law review article in which Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis "argued that the law should protect a right
of privacy, or 'quiet zone,' in each person's life to protect human dignity
from the prying of others."'17 Their argument for the establishment of a
separate, recognizable invasion of privacy tort eventually won credence
and recognition.1
8
New York was among the first states to address the elements of this
new tort in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,' 9 a case that concerned
the unauthorized use of a photograph as part of an advertisement.2 0 After
the appellate court reversed the lower court decision and denied the
existence of the right of privacy,2' a backlash of criticism led to the
enactment of a New York privacy statute one year later in 1903 .22 This
statute prohibited the "use of any person's 'name, portrait, or picture' for
'advertising purposes,' or for 'purposes of trade,' without that person's
written consent., 23 New York's innovative statute became the model for
"name-and-likeness" statutes subsequently enacted in seven states, 24
including the Florida statute at issue in Tyne.
25
In his 1960 article, Professor Prosser established and outlined the four
15. See generally William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960) (outlining the
creation of the law of privacy doctrine).
16. THOMAS M. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
17. Alicia M. Hunt, Comment, Everyone Wants To Be a Star: Extensive Publicity Rights for
Noncelebrities Unduly Restrict Commercial Speech, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1605, 1612-13 (2001)
(discussing Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890)).
18. Hunt, supra note 17, at 1613.
19. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
20. See id.; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 6:3. (stating that the "'right of publicity'
was first recognized.., by the federal Second Circuit Court of Appeals under New York
common law").
21. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 448.
22. Hunt, supra note 17, at 1613.
23. Fred M. Weiler, The Right of Publicity Gone Wrong: A Case for Privileged
Appropriation of Identity, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 223, 224 (1994) (quoting 1903 N.Y.
Laws 132 §§ 1-2 (codified as amended at N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992))).
24. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 6:3 n.8. (listing the seven states that have statutes that
embody the right of publicity: California, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Ohio, Texas, and
Wisconsin). New York is now seen as a special case, since courts have rejected the existence of
common law rights of privacy in that state, despite the fact that the right of publicity exists within
the framework of the New York statute. Hunt, supra note 17, at 1613.
25. See discussion infra Part 1.
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invasion of privacy torts for which remedies may be afforded. 26 These four
categories are: "(1) Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or
into his private affairs. (2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts
about the plaintiff. (3) Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in
the public eye. (4) Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the
plaintiffs name or likeness. 27 In 1976, the authors of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts adopted Prosser's four invasion of privacy torts.28
Prosser's first tort of intrusion plays no role in Tyne, and therefore
will not be discussed in this note. However, the remaining three torts are
relevant to Tyne and will be addressed in the order set forth by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.
B. Right of Publicity: The Unauthorized Use of Name or Likeness
1. A Brief History
In 1953, Judge Jerome Frank in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.29 coined the phrase "right of publicity. '30 Judge Frank
reasoned that prominent persons, "far from having their feelings bruised
through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if
they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements,
popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines,
busses, trains and subways.' Currently, under the right of publicity,
"[o]ne who appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity by
using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of
identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability .... 12 In designating
this tort the "right of publicity," Judge Frank made progress toward
breaking the "logjam of confusion" 33 regarding the similar and sometimes
26. Prosser, supra note, 15 at 389.
27. Id.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the
resulting harm to the interests of the other. (2) The right of privacy is invaded by
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in § 652B; or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness, as stated in § 652C; or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, as stated in § 652D; or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public, as
stated in § 652E. Id.
29. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
30. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1:26.
31. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
33. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1:26.
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befuddling privacy torts.34
In 1977, the Supreme Court acknowledged the right of publicity in
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, Co. 35 as a separate and distinct
commercial tort.36 However, since that landmark decision, the Supreme
Court has refused to grant certiorari in any other right of publicity cases,
perhaps expecting that "Congress will ... federalize this severely
Balkanized area of the law."
37
2. Privacy Right v. Property Right
The right of publicity is recognized in a majority of states through an
assortment of statutes and common law.38 The prevailing view recognizes
the right of publicity as a tort that "protects the commercial value of one's
identity,"39 whereas the right of privacy protects the "right to be let
alone." 40 According to J. Thomas McCarthy, since the recognition of the
right of publicity as a separate and distinct tort, numerous jurisdictions
have established that it extends primarily to celebrities as a property right,
34. See id. As a result of a medley of conflicting case law and statutes, legalese in this
particular area of law is particularly difficult to define; terms such as invasion of privacy, right of
privacy, right of publicity, appropriation, and misappropriation are often interchanged and
misused. Throughout this paper the "name and likeness" torts, including § 540.08, will be
referred to as right of publicity, never as right of privacy. Black's Law Dictionary defines these
overlapping terms as follows: Right of privacy is the "right of a person and the person's property
to be free from unwarranted public scrutiny or exposure." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1325 (7th
ed. 1999). Right of publicity is the "right to control the use of one's own name, picture, or
likeness and to prevent another from using it for commercial benefit without one's consent." Id.
35. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
36. Id. at 573. Zacchini overcame the First Amendment challenge and successfully stated a
right of publicity claim after a television station broadcasted his entire cannonball act during its
newscast without the entertainer's permission. See Zacchini 433 U.S. 562. The Court said that
much of the economic value of Zacchini's act "lies in the 'right of exclusive control over the
publicity given to his performance"' because if the public can see the act for free on television,
they will be less willing to pay to see it at a fair. Id. at 575.
37. Douglas E. Mirell, Worming Around the First Amendment: An Overview of Recent
Developments in Publicity Rights Litigation, Address to the Los Angeles Copyright Society (Oct.
1,2003).
38. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 6:3. The seven states with statutes that embody the
right of publicity discussed in note 24, are joined by eleven additional states, which have
recognized a common-law right of publicity: Arizona, Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. Additionally, ten states (Indiana, Massachusetts,
Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington)
have statutes which are labeled "privacy," but are worded in such a way that embodies most
aspects of the right of publicity. Id. at § 6:3 & n.9.
39. Hunt, supra note 17, at 1615.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. a (1976).
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while the right of privacy primarily applies to noncelebrities as a privacy
right.
4 1
The primary difference between these two torts is the type of damages
awarded. The right of publicity protects monetary and commercial
interests, 42 "while privacy rights protect.., less tangible interests in dignity
and integrity of the self. '43 In a right of publicity case, damages are
generally measured by the commercial value of an identity based upon the
fair market value the advertiser would have had to pay to use that person's
(usually celebrated) character. 4 By contrast, right of privacy damages are
based on the mental distress 45 that result from an intrusion into "a secluded
and private life, free from the prying eyes [and] ears" of the public.
46
Basically, a right of publicity infringement "focuses upon injury to the
pocketbook, while an invasion of 'appropriation privacy' focuses upon
injury to the psyche. 'A7 The modem approach is to maintain a distinction
between the two torts.4 8 However, courts often fail to maintain this
distinction,49 and thus "confuse and blur the boundary between the two
causes of action.,
50
3. Celebrity Status
Right of publicity cases are unique because they prevent "unjust
enrichment by providing a remedy against exploitation of the goodwill and
reputation that a person develops in his name or likeness through the
investment of time, effort, and money.",5' Therefore, rights of publicity
41. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 4:15.
42. See id.
43. Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of the
Tort of Appropriation ofIdentity, 17 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 213 (1999).
44. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETMON § 49 cmt. d (1995).
45. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 5:61 (distinguishing the two causes of action).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. b (1976).
47. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 5:6 1.
48. See Hunt, supra note 17, at 1608-09 n.28 ("It is likely that most courts are not
intentionally rejecting the modem explanation of the two torts. The most likely reason courts are
often (though not always) using a property-based analysis in misappropriation cases is that the
1977 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 625C contains an explanation of the common-law tort
of misappropriation that pre-dates the modem view. The RESTATEMENT adopts the view
advanced by William Prosser, before the growth of the right of publicity, that invasion of privacy
by misappropriation protects both the commercial value of one's identity, as well as any
commercial harm.").
49. Id.
50. Kahn, supra note 43, at 214.
51. Bi-Rite Enter., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see F.
Jay Dougherty, Foreword: The Right of Publicity-Towards a Comparative and International
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cases generally require celebrity status, as "there is little pecuniary gain in
appropriating the name and likeness of an unknown individual. 52
Misappropriation cases that attach the "privacy" label can seriously confuse
attorneys.53 After all, how could public personalities "be concerned about
privacy, since, by virtue of their celebrity, they had thrust themselves into
the public light"?54 This issue led earlier courts to reject the claim that the
commercial use of a celebrity's identity could possibly be considered an
invasion of privacy since these plaintiffs were already in the public eye.
This rationale facilitated the establishment of the right of publicity as its
own unique tort designed to protect the property value of celebrities'
identities, rather than their privacy interests. 6 Therefore, although the right
to prohibit the unauthorized commercial use of identity developed first
under the rubric of privacy law, the right of publicity developed
specifically as a celebrity's tort,57 despite the fact there are actually
hundreds of right of publicity cases involving noncelebrities.58
While some courts have grappled with defining the term "celebrity,"
comparing it to "trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall[,]y 59 in most
jurisdictions celebrity status is no longer a required element for the tort.6 °
The focus should not be on the individual's celebrity, but "instead on the
interest that would be protected in preventing the unauthorized use of that
individual's identity.' In fact, the majority view has extended protection
to noncelebrities on the theory that fame or notoriety goes to the endgame
of commercial damages, not to the existence of the right.62 In contrast to
Perspective, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 421, 440-46 (1998) (discussing the rationales behind the
fight of publicity, which include both natural fights, theories, and economic theories; under the
heading of natural rights theories fall unjust enrichment, labor theory, and personality theory, and
under the rubric of economic theories, fall utilitarian/incentive theory, consumer protection
arguments, and allocative economic theory).
52. Weiler, supra note 23, at 224 n.8.
53. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1:25.
54. Hunt, supra note 17, at 1614. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170
(5th Cir. 1941) (holding that professional football player David O'Brien was a celebrity and could
not be harmed by mere publicity when Pabst beer used his photograph in an advertising calendar).
55. See Hunt, supra note 17, at 1614.
56. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1:7. See, e.g., Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868 (recognizing the
monetary value of one's own name and likeness).
57. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1:7.
58. See generally I.J. Schiffres, Annotation, Invasion of Privacy by Use of Plaintiff's Name
or Likeness in Advertising, 23 A.L.R. 3d 865 (1999) (summarizing the extent of particular uses of
noncelebrity plaintiffs' names or likenesses as constituting invasion of privacy).
59. Rosanova v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
60. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 4:15.
61. Hunt, supra note 17, at 1628.
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995) ("[c]elebrities are
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this view, a minority of jurisdictions have held the right of publicity is
solely a celebrity's right, and noncelebrities should only be able to recover
when they can demonstrate considerable commercial value in their
identity.63 The American Bar Association's ("ABA") Intellectual Property
Law Section's proposal for a federal right of publicity statute adopts the
majority approach, allowing the right of publicity to apply to noncelebrities
regardless of the demonstrable commercial value of their identity. 64
C. Florida's Approach to the Right of Publicity: Section 540.08
Invasion of privacy was firmly established as an actionable tort in the
state of Florida in the 1944 landmark case of Cason v. Baskin.65 Twenty-
three years later, Florida enacted section 540.08,66 recognizing the need to
codify the right of publicity as a separate tort. Under Florida's commercial
misappropriation statute, the publication of a name, portrait, photograph, or
other likeness of any person for trade, commercial, or advertising purposes
with neither that person's express written or oral consent, nor the consent
of any other authorized person, including a surviving spouse or child, is
prohibited.67 In order to prevail in an action brought under section 540.08,
the name or likeness must be specifically identifiable as that of the
plaintiff6 8 and must directly promote a product or service.
69
not precluded from establishing cognizable injury to personal interests in addition to commercial
loss, nor are less well-known plaintiffs precluded from establishing commercial loss in addition to
injury to personal interests ....").
63. Hunt, supra note 17, at 1607. In Hunt's comment, she contends that the application of
the right of publicity to noncelebrities is a problematic expansion of the tort, since the "right of
publicity developed as a special right for celebrities to protect the commercial value that
celebrities had developed in their persona. The extension of the right of publicity to noncelebrities
is disturbing because in many instances, it interferes with the First Amendment's protection of
commercial speech." Id. at 1609.
64. See Proposed Right of Publicity Act, 2000 A.B.A. SEC. OF INTELL. PROP. L. Comm.
201, Subcomm. C. 8, discussion available at
http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/coursematerials/committee-201 -report.doc. The Section's
proposed statute is in draft form and has not been formally proposed or adopted by the ABA.
65. 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944) (identifying the prima facie case for right of privacy when
plaintiff sued defendant for writing a partial biography containing unflattering descriptions).
66. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West Supp. 2001).
67. Id. at § 540.08(1).
68. See PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 117, at 853 (5th ed. 1984) (suggesting
no liability for publishing a photo of a hand or a foot if there is nothing to indicate to whom it
belongs).
69. Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619, 622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 198 1).
MISSING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY BOAT
1. Defining "Trade" and "Commercial" Under Section 540.08
Section 540.08 does not define the terms "trade," "commercial," or
"advertising. ' 70 Thus, the scope of the right of publicity varies widely
depending on how judges or juries choose to interpret these terms.
According to case law, the terms "trade," "commercial," and
"advertising" under section 540.08 are designed to prevent the
unauthorized use of a name or likeness from "directly promot[ing] the
product or service.",71 This narrow approach to defining "commercial" is
illustrated in Lane v. MRA Holdings, 72 where a 17-year-old girl exposed
her breasts in a public place for a Girls Gone Wild video and related
television commercials. 73 While her likeness was obviously a part of the
video, it was not used to directly promote a product or service.7 4 Thus, the
use and publication of her likeness by the company did not violate section
540.08. In other words, the publication of her image in Girls Gone Wild did
not become actionable simply because the tapes contained her image and
were sold for a profit; in order to become actionable a defendant must use
the name or likeness to directly promote sales of the tape.75 In Nottage v.
American Express Co. 7 6 "commercial use" was again interpreted narrowly,
but with a different result.77 The plaintiff, a condominium doorman,
adequately stated a cause of action under section 540.08 when his picture
70. § 540.08(1).
71. Loft, 408 So. 2d at 622-23.
72. 242 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
73. Id. at 1209.
Like Tyne and Loft, Lane's lawsuit arose from an expressive work that has no
purpose other than to entertain a segment of the general population. Moreover, as in
Tyne and Loft, the Plaintiff in this case is not shown endorsing or promoting a
product, but rather as participating in an expressive work.
Id. at 1215. But see Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Entertainment, Arts and Sports Law
Section of the Florida Bar at 15-16, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286 (1 1th Cir.
2003) (No. 02-13281) ("The parade of horribles flowing from the erroneous Loft decision has
already begun. This Court need look no further than the decision in Lane . . . . Now
pornographers and pedophiles have been given an open door to video underage girls in the nude
and distribute the same.").
74. Lane, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1215.
75. Id. But see, Gritzke v. M.R.A. Holding, LLC, No. 4:01CV495-RH, 2002 WL 32107540,
at * 1 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2002) (holding, under facts remarkably similar to Lane, that the plaintiff
had "squarely alleged that defendant published her photograph in Florida for commercial and
advertising purposes-specifically on the package of defendant's videotape and in advertisements
therefor-and that defendant did so without her permission"). However, the plaintiff in Gritzke
was complaining about the use of her image on the outside cover of a videotape package, and in
Lane the plaintiff did not allege that her likeness was used in box cover advertising.
76. 452 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
77. Id. at 1068.
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was taken at his place of work and used without his consent for mass-
mailed postcards and large posters advertising the condominium. 8
More recently, in Cummings v. Sony Music,79 a musician sued under
section 540.08 alleging the unauthorized use of his commercial "image,
name and vocals on eight compact disc recordings performed by the
musical group, Harold Melvin & The Blue Notes." 80 The defendant sought
a stay pending the decision in Tyne.81 The Cummings court however denied
the stay, holding that even under a narrow reading of section 540.08, an
allegation of public use of a photograph for commercial purposes, without
permission, stated a sufficient commercial misappropriation claim.82 Unlike
Lane's image, the photograph of Cummings was found on the packaging of
the compact discs and therefore constituted a commercial use.83 Clearly,
courts in Florida are construing section 540.08 quite narrowly, employing it
only for direct promotion of a product or service.
2. Descendibility Under Section 540.08
Jurisdictions that recognize either a statutory or common law right of
publicity often disagree as to the inheritability of the right.84 There are three
distinct interpretations of descendibility in case law: "1) the right of
publicity is a property right and thus inheritable; 2) the right of publicity is
a personal privacy right, and thus may only be asserted by the individual
during his or her lifetime; and 3) the right of publicity should be
descendible only if the individual has attempted to commercially exploit
his persona during his lifetime. 85 The issue of descendibility is no longer
as contentious as it once was.86 The majority of jurisdictions that have
considered the issue now recognize that the right of publicity should be
78. Id.
79. No. 01-C4375, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17394, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003)
(interpreting Florida law in a New York court).
80. Id.
81. Id. at *4.
82. Id. at *10.
83. Id. at *11. See also Gritzke, No. 4:01CV495-RH. Under this rationale, plaintiffs in Tyne
would have a stronger case if they or their family members' images were depicted on
merchandise or DVD packaging of The Perfect Storm; however, no merchandise or videos
contained their likenesses. See Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286, 1288-89 (1 lth
Cir. 2003).
84. Weiler, supra note 23, at 225.
85. Id. at 235 n.90.
86. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?,
17 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 191, 207-28 (1983) (detailing various approaches courts have adopted to
determine whether the right of publicity is descendible).
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descendible.87 Nonetheless, little uniformity exists with respect to the
duration of that right subsequent to the plaintiff's death.88
Under section 540.08, a decedent's name cannot be commercially
exploited unless the requisite consent is obtained from the decedent's
family or other designated representatives, 89 and an action may be brought
to enjoin a defendant or to recover damages as long as the misappropriation
occurs within forty years of the person's death. 90 The action may be
instituted by a "person, firm, or corporation authorized in writing to license
the commercial use" of a decedent's name or likeness, or if no written
authority was so given, the surviving spouse and children may sue (like the
surviving family did in Tyne). 9t In theory, "right of publicity actions by
relatives of a decedent ... should not suffer from this confusion because
the right of publicity, unlike the personal right of privacy, can be assigned
or licensed during an individual's lifetime and made the subject of an
express or implied contract."
92
3. Right of Publicity v. First Amendment
The right of publicity as recognized by statute and common law is
fundamentally limited by the First Amendment. 93 Since newsworthy and
political speech, as well as speech in the form of entertainment, enjoy the
utmost protection under the First Amendment, 94 freedom of speech remains
a legitimate defense against a right of publicity action.95 The film and
publishing industries are often designed purely around principles of
entertainment value and are therefore widely immune from right of
publicity liability.96 This immunity is generally based on the grounds that
artistic or expressive outlets demand high levels of First Amendment
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. h (1995).
88. Id. ("Statutes recognizing descendibility typically limit the duration of post mortem
rights to a fixed term of years"). A number of states recognize post mortem publicity rights by
statute, usually subject to a fixed duration. See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(4) (40 years);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(h) (70 years).
89. § 540,08(1)(c).
90. § 540,08(4).
91. § 540,08(1)(c)(2).
92. See Kwall, supra note 86, at 210.
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (1995).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (affd on other
grounds, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989)); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454,
461-62 (Cal. 1979).
96. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 8:74 (stating fictional use of human identity
in docudramas is not actionable as an invasion of privacy).
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protection.97 Thus, films and published works enjoy a level of shelter under
the First Amendment that is not given to mere "merchandise" because they
are "vehicles through which ideas and opinions are disseminated .... 98
Consequently, the right of publicity does not ordinarily include the use of a
person's identity in news reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of
fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental to such uses.99
Some courts have used a framework borrowed from copyright law's
fair use analysis' 00 to resolve the tension between right of publicity and the
First Amendment, while other courts have developed their own tests. 101
The California Supreme Court recently relied on and expounded upon the
transformative test that it developed in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v.
Gary Saderup, Inc. 102 The transformative test asserts that it "does not
matter what precise literary category the work falls into. What matters is
whether the work is transformative rather than whether it is parody or satire
or caricature or serious social commentary or any other specific form of
expression."' 0 3 Professor F. Jay Dougherty writes that "[i]f the
transformativeness test is subjected to the Supreme Court's modem
approach to assessing the constitutionality of state laws regulating speech,
it should be found unconstitutional."
10 4
The Missouri Supreme Court took another approach and turned to
attorney Mark S. Lee's proposed predominance test in John Doe v. TCI
Cablevision: 
105
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the
commercial value of an individual's identity, that product should
be held to violate the right of publicity and not be protected by
the First Amendment, even if there is some 'expressive' content
in it that might qualify as 'speech' in other circumstances. If, on
the other hand, the predominant purpose of the product is to
make an expressive comment on or about a celebrity, the
97. Id.
98. Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See Joseph
Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952).
99. See Hicks, 464 F. Supp at 430.
100. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 8:38.
101. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property
and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47,57-61 (1994); MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 8:38.
102. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
103. Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473,479 (Cal. 2003).
104. F. Jay Dougherty, All the World's Not a Stooge: The "Transformativeness" Test for
Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a
Work ofArt, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 35 (2003).
105. 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
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expressive values could be given greater weight. 1
06
Lee's predominance test "threatens core First Amendment
interests . . [and] is slanted heavily towards celebrity interests, provides no
meaningful guidelines as to what purpose is 'predominate,' and could chill
many traditional media uses of real names that clearly should be protected
by the First Amendment."' 1 7 Beyond copyright's fair use analysis and these
particular tests, courts have also suggested avoiding the conflict entirely by
narrowly construing the scope of the statute or common law at issue when
it is applied to expressive works, including motion pictures.
0 8
Section 540.08 expressly circumscribes the right of publicity when it
conflicts with the First Amendment, stating that the right of publicity is
inapplicable when a name or likeness is used in any news medium as part
of a good faith news report or presentation that has current, legitimate
public interest, as long as the name or likeness is not used for advertising
purposes. 0 9 As Tyne demonstrates, however, these statutory exceptions
tend to be insufficiently flexible to resolve the right of publicity's conflict
with the First Amendment." 0 Nevertheless, expressive works generally
tend to prevail when challenged by those who argue for narrow
interpretations of right of publicity statutes." I'
Rogers v. Grimaldi provides an example of this First Amendment
protection for motion pictures. 12 Ginger Rogers sued the producer of a
Fellini film called Ginger and Fred, which was a fictional account of an
Italian dance team that emulated Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers.1 3 When
Rogers alleged an infringement of her right of publicity, 14 everything
106. Id. at 374. (quoting Marc S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the
Right of Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 500 (2003)); see also
Tina Spee, Law Review Article Guides Missouri High Country in Ruling, DAILY JOURNAL
EXTRA, Sept. 22, 2003, at 6.
107. Dougherty, supra note 104, at 14 n.67.
108. See, e.g., Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d 430, 433 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (holding that
there was no direct use of a name to promote a product when plaintiffs name was used in song
about the murder trial of prizefighter Ruben Carter).
109. § 540.08(3)(a).
110. See Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1291, 1293.
111. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 2 § 8:74. "[E]ven if Defendants used Plaintiffs'
names to advertise their film-a fact not reflected in the record-such advertisements would
likewise be protected under the First Amendment." Amicus Curiae Brief of The Motion Picture
Association of America, Inc., et al. at 14, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286 (1 lth
Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13281).
112. 695 F. Supp. 112, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aft'don other grounds, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.
1989).
113. See id. at 114.
114. Id. at 121.
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seemed to be in her favor-she was a celebrity and the film was a
commercial endeavor. However, the court held that the First Amendment
provides a complete defense to a right of publicity action as long as a film
is not an "advertisement in disguise."' 1 5 Similarly, the plaintiff in
Polydoros v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.116 was precluded from
prevailing on a claim of commercial misappropriation when a character,
similar in name and appearance to him as a child, appeared in the film The
Sandlot, which was written by his childhood acquaintance." 7 Even though
filmmakers used photographs of the character in advertising The Sandlot,
the First Amendment protected the film from right of publicity liability." 8
The Perfect Storm, like Ginger and Fred and The Sandlot, was an
expressive work inherently protected by the First Amendment. Despite this
precedent, plaintiffs argued in Tyne that the First Amendment does not
protect Warner. 119 The plaintiffs in Tyne sued not only under section
540.08, but also under common law theories of false light invasion of
privacy and public disclosure of private facts.'
20
D. Common Law Invasion of Privacy
1. False Light Invasion of Privacy
One that places another person "before the public in a false light" is
subject to liability under the common law tort of false light invasion of
privacy. Liability occurs so long as "(a) the false light in which the other
was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the
actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard 2 2 as to the falsity of
115. See id. at 124.
116. 67 Cal. App. 4th 318 (2d Dist. 1997), appeal dismissed, 965 P.2d 724 (Cal. 1998).
Both examples of first amendment protection come from California courts, simply because that is
where the vast majority of Hollywood cases are heard. Under Part IV of this note, Loft, a Florida
case that is highly comparable to Tyne, will be thoroughly analyzed, partially on First
Amendment grounds.
117. Id. at 320-21.
118. Id. at 325.
119. See discussion infra Part IV.
120. Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1289.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
122. The American Law Institute that drafted the Restatement of Torts set forth a caveat that
it took "no position on whether there are any circumstances under which recovery can be obtained
. . . if the actor did not know of or act with reckless disregard as to the falsity of the matter
publicized and the false light in which the other would be placed but was negligent in regard to
these matters." Id.
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the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be
placed."'
' 23
It is essential that the matter published be false because the tort's
purpose is to protect people from appearing before the public in a light that
is other than truthful. 124 A false light cause of action also requires
publicity. 125 This is satisfied only when the matter in controversy is
communicated to the public at large, or to enough individuals, so that it
becomes general knowledge. 126 It is necessary that a reasonable person be
seriously offended as a result of a major misrepresentation of character,
history, activities or beliefs. 12 7 Thus, the hypersensitive will not be
protected, 128 and mere inaccuracy in reporting will not support recovery.
129
Although it is not necessary for the plaintiff to be defamed, false light cases
often form a basis for defamation actions as well. 130 However, the
difference between these two actions is that the tort of defamation is
intended to protect public reputation, while an action for false light protects
the right to be let alone.'
31
2. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
Another common law tort recognized in Florida that falls under the
invasion of privacy heading is public disclosure of private facts. This tort
can remedy invasions into a non-celebrity's privacy. 1
32
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life
of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of
legitimate concern to the public.'
33
There are four required elements in a cause of action for public disclosure
of private facts: (1) the disclosure must be public; (2) the disclosure must
123. Id.
124. Id. § 652E cmt. a.
125. See Prosser, supra note 26, at 400.
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. a (1977).
127. Id. § 652E cmt. c.
128. See Jacova v. S. Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955) (holding that the
plaintiffs privacy had not been violated when he became the innocent subject of a televised
gambling crackdown).
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. c (1977).
130. See id. § 652E cmt. b.
131. See Prosser, supra note 26, at 400.
132. Hunt, supra note 17, at 1607.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
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include private facts that are not already exposed to the public eye; (3) the
disclosure must be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable
person; and (4) there must be no legitimate public interest in the
disclosure. 134 As with false light invasion of privacy, "the hypersensitive
individual will not be protected."' 35 Unlike California, Florida has not
adopted a fifth prong, which would require malice or a reckless disregard in
addition to the offensiveness of the disclosure.' 
36
Written disclosure of private facts was originally required for a
plaintiff to successfully bring a suit-mere spoken words could not support
a privacy action.' 37 More recently, this principle has been tailored to
include disclosure through publication of photographs,'38 and through other
media, including television 139 and motion pictures. 140 In Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 141 the Supreme Court held that under the First Amendment
there can be no recovery for disclosure of truthful facts that are a matter of
public record. 142 However, the case leaves open the question of whether
liability can constitutionally be imposed for other private facts that would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person and that are not of legitimate
concern. 143 The Florida Supreme Court has declared that in determining
whether a matter is of public concern, the court should focus on whether
the published information as a whole is of general public concern, not
whether particular facts are of legitimate public concern. 144 Often, whether
something is of legitimate public concern hinges on the notoriety of the
person as a public figure.
145
134. See id.
135. See, e.g., Cape Publ'ns, Inc. v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 893 (1983) (stating that kidnapping situations are matters of general public interest, and
therefore information that is lawfully obtained about a particular case is considered newsworthy).
136. See Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 768 (1983).
137. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 17, at 217.
138. See, e.g., Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (Mo. 1942).
139. See, e.g., Taylor v. K.T.V.B., Inc., 525 P.2d 984, 988 (Idaho 1974). In this case, a
television station was sued for invasion of privacy after airing a film clip featuring the plaintiff.
Id. at 985.
140. See, e.g., Donahue v. Warner Bros., 272 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1954). There, a film
studio was sued for invasion of privacy by a widow and daughter due to a film's depiction of a
deceased entertainer. Id. at 178.
141. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
142. See idat 496.
143. See id. at 490-91.
144. See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 299-300 (1983).
145. Courts have agreed that if a person emerges from seclusion and becomes an actor in an
occurrence of public interest, then there is no invasion of privacy in publishing an account of the
occurrence. See Jacova. 83 So. 2d at 36.
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3. Procedural Standing for Common Law Invasion of Privacy
Courts have held that the right of privacy is a personal right peculiar
to the person whose privacy has been invaded. 146 Since there can be no
invasion of a personal right after the individual has died, the relatives of a
decedent may not sue for an invasion of the decedent's privacy that
occurred after his or her death. 147 Consequently, family members, unless
their own rights of privacy have been violated as well, have no standing to
sue under the common law. 148 Holding otherwise could lead to double
recovery. 149 However, if the privacy of a family member has been
independently violated as a result of the plaintiffs privacy having been
invaded, the cause of action may succeed and the family member of the
deceased will have standing to sue under the doctrine of "relational right of
privacy."' 150 This exception is only permitted where the portrayal of a dead
family member is "sufficiently egregious," and not "merely inaccurate or
dramatized.'
15 1
4. Damages
After establishing a cause of action for invasion of privacy, plaintiffs
can be afforded injunctive relief' 52 or actual or compensatory damages
53
146. See Kwall, supra note 86, at 208.
147. See Loft, 408 So. 2d at 621.
148. See Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9, 12 (5th Cir. 1962); See
also Kwall, supra note 86, at 208.
149. Santiesteban, 306 F.2d at 12.
150. Fla. SupCt Asked to Interpret Commercial Misappropriation Statute, 31 Media Law
Reporter 28, (July 22, 2003), at http://ipcenter.bna.com/pic2/ip.nsf/id/BNAP-
5PPL8T?OpenDocument.
151. See id.
152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 48(2) (1995).
The appropriateness and scope of injunctive relief depend upon a comparative
appraisal of all the factors of the case, including the following primary factors: (a)
the nature of the interest to be protected; (b) the nature and extent of the
appropriation; (c) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of an injunction and of other
remedies; (d) the relative harm likely to result to the legitimate interests of the
defendant if an injunction is granted and to the legitimate interests of the plaintiff if
an injunction is denied; (e) the interests of third persons and of the public; (f) any
unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit or otherwise asserting his or her
rights; (g) any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff; and (h) the
practicality of framing and enforcing the injunction.
Id.
153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49(2) (1995).
Whether an award of monetary relief is appropriate and the appropriate method of
measuring such relief depend upon a comparative appraisal of all the factors of the
case, including the following primary factors: (a) the degree of certainty with which
the plaintiff has established the fact and extent of the pecuniary loss or the actor's
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based on injuries resulting from the tortious conduct, including impairment
of health, mental anguish, loss of friends, loss of respect in the community,
and injury to character or reputation. 154 If the evidence fails to demonstrate
a substantial injury, the plaintiff may be awarded nominal or statutory
damages. 155 Tyne should never reach an assessment of damages.
156
However, assuming that it does, damages will only be assessed under
Florida's right of publicity statute, which specifically provides for both
compensatory and punitive damages. 1
57
III. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF TYNE v. TIME WARNER
The material facts surrounding Tyne v. Time Warner are
undisputed.158 In October 1991, a rare confluence of meteorological events
led to a powerful weather system off the New England Coast, termed the
"storm of the century.' ' 159 The Andrea Gail, a commercial fishing vessel,
was lost at sea during the peak of the tempest. 160 All of the crewmembers
aboard the vessel, including the boat's captain, Billy Tyne, and fisherman
Dale Murphy, Sr., were presumed dead.' 6 1 The meteorological forces which
caused the loss of the Andrea Gail were the subject of newspaper and
television reports, as well as a book written by Sebastian Junger entitled
The Perfect Storm: A True Story of Men Against the Sea.'6 2 Published in
1997, the book was based upon news reports, as well as personal interviews
pecuniary gain resulting from the appropriation; (b) the nature and extent of the
appropriation; (c) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of other remedies; (d) the
intent of the actor and whether the actor knew or should have known that the
conduct was unlawful; (e) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit
or otherwise asserting his or her rights; and (f) any related misconduct on the part
of the plaintiff.
Id.
154. See Cason, 20 So. 2d at 250.
155. See generally id. at 247 (allowing only nominal damages since there was no substantial
injury or actual mental anguish suffered).
156. See infra Part V (discussing why the Florida Supreme Court should find in Warner's
favor).
157. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(2). See Santiesteban, 306 F.2d at 12 ("[M]alice is not
required to be shown in cases based on an alleged invasion of the right of privacy but malice may
form the basis for punitive damages.").
158. See Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Dispositive Motion for
Summary Judgment at 2, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286 (11 th Cir. 2003) (No.
02-13281).
159. Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1288.
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with meteorologists, local fishermen and relatives of the deceased,
163
including plaintiffs Jodi Tyne and Debra Tigue. 164 That same year, Warner
purchased motion picture rights to Junger's bestseller. 165
In June 2000, Warner released the film entitled The Perfect Storm,
which predominantly depicted the lives and deaths of Tyne and Murphy,
166
played by George Clooney and John C. Reilley, respectively. 167 The film
was far more fictionalized than Junger's book, 168 portraying Tyne, "the
main protagonist in the [p]icture ... as a down-and-out swordboat captain
who was obsessed with the next big catch.', 16 9 Furthermore, Warner took
additional artistic license with the land-based interpersonal relationships
between crewmembers and their families, including the plaintiffs, who
were briefly depicted in the film.
170
Plaintiffs note that the motion picture was reviewed by film critics
who found that Tyne was depicted as a captain who had "hit a dry patch"
and whose last catch was "dwarfed by that of rival captain Linda Greenlaw
(Mary Elizabeth Mastrantonio) and scorned by the greedy boat owner
(Michael Ironside).' 17 1 According to the film's scenario, Tyne, in sheer
desperation, decided to head "with Ahab-like obsessiveness" into "the
treacherous October weather."' 172 One particular scene is "an admittedly
fabricated depiction of Tyne berating his crew for wanting to return to port
in Gloucester, Massachusetts.', 173 Tyne was left with the choice of "either
waiting out the storm and losing the catch or facing it and perhaps losing"
all of his crew; the script had Tyne choosing the latter. 174 However, since
163. Id.
164. Both Jodi Tyne and Debra Tigue consented to multiple meetings with Junger.
Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Their Dispositive Motion for Summary
Judgment at 4, Tyne (No. 02-1328 1).
165. Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1288.
166. Id.
167. Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Their Dispositive Motion for
Summary Judgment at 10, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
168. Peterson explained under deposition that The Perfect Storm is "'not a documentary [but
rather] a motion picture, largely fictionalized."' Appellants' Brief in Support of Appeal at 5-8,
Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13281). He went on to
assert that 'Sebastian [Junger] hypothesized what might have happened and we dramatized
that."' Id. at 12.
169. Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1288.
170. Id.
171. Movants' Initial Brief on Question Certified By The Eleventh Circuit at 17 n.7, Tyne v.
Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286 (1lth Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13281) (quoting Peter Keough,
Sea Plus, The Perfect Storm is Downgraded, THE BOSTON PHOENIX, June 29, 2000).
172. Id.
173. Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1288.
174. See Keough, supra note 171.
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"the vessel was lost at sea and the crew was never found, no one [actually]
knows the events that occurred aboard the Andrea Gail after it left
Gloucester, Massachusetts in October 1991."71
Warner admittedly "neither sought permission from the individuals
depicted in the picture nor compensated them in any manner."', 76 While The
Perfect Storm did not hold itself out as precisely truthful, it did offer the
disclaimer on screen that "THIS FILM IS BASED ON A TRUE
STORY.' ' 177 Early press releases contained a similar statement, suggesting
that the film was "'[the] true story of the fiercest, most powerful storm in
modem history."" 78 Additionally, a disclaimer inserted into the closing
credits provided the following statement: "This film is based on actual
historical events contained in 'The Perfect Storm' by Sebastian Junger.
Dialogue and certain events and characters in the film were created for the
purpose of fictionalization."'
' 79
Defendants also concede that The Perfect Storm was quite successful
at the box office grossing over $150 million.' 80 Furthermore, the motion
picture has been released and sold in VHS and DVD formats, shown on
cable and pay-per-view television, and has spawned merchandise,
including t-shirts and posters.' 8 ' However, none of the merchandise
contains the likenesses of Tyne, Murphy, or any of the plaintiffs.I8 2
On August 24, 2000, plaintiffs filed suit against Time Warner
Entertainment Co., Baltimore/Spring Creek Pictures, and Radiant
Productions, on a total of thirteen counts, 83 asserting claims for: "(1)
175. Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Their Dispositive Motion for
Summary Judgment at 3, Tyne (No. 02-1328 1).
176. Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1288.
177. Id. at 1288-89.
178. Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Their Dispositive Motion for
Summary Judgment at 10, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
179. The Perfect Storm (Warner Bros. 1997). Wolfgang Peterson, the film's Director and
Executive Producer, testified that "'nobody knows what really happened. So again, I had to
fictionalize .. .- Appellants Brief in Support of Appeal at 7, Tyne (No. 02-13281). Peterson also
admitted that the film's depiction of Tyne's earlier lack of commercial success was contradicted
by facts of Junger's book and that the scene where Tyne berates the crew for wanting to turn
back, was entirely fabricated. Id. at 8.
180. Tyne, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Joint Final Pretrial Statement at 3, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286
(11 th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13281).
Each of the Plaintiffs has filed a count of commercial misappropriation under F.S.
540.08 in their respective individual capacities (Counts Two, Three, Four, Nine,
Ten and Thirteen). The Tyne and Murphy children have each filed a count of
statutory misappropriation on behalf of their respective decedent fathers (Counts
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unauthorized commercial appropriation of decedents' likenesses, in
violation of [section] 540.08; (2) unauthorized commercial appropriation of
Plaintiffs' likenesses, also in violation of [section] 540.08; (3) common law
invasion of privacy-false light; and (4) common law invasion of privacy
based on [public] disclosure of private facts."' 184 Plaintiffs sought
$10,350,000 in compensatory damages, 185 as well as additional punitive
damages "based upon the intentional nature of Warner's misconduct,
including its actual knowledge of the wrongfulness of the conduct and the
high probability of injury."'
86
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST Two 187 TYNE CASES
A. Round #1-Florida's District Court Decision
In a May 9, 2002 order, the district court granted Warner's motion for
summary judgment on all thirteen counts. 88
1. Right of Publicity
Plaintiffs alleged that by using the names and likenesses of decedents
Tyne and Murphy in The Perfect Storm without the consent of their
respective families, Warner violated section 540.08.189 Plaintiffs also
asserted claims based on the film's depiction of their own likenesses
One and Eight). Additionally, the Tyne children have each filed common law
counts of invasion of privacy under the theory of presentation in a false light arising
from the false depiction of their deceased father, Billy Tyne (Counts Five and Six).
Count Seven, which had originally alleged invasion of privacy by false light on
behalf of Jodi Tyne, was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice by Plaintiff .... The
Murphy child and his mother, Debra J. Tigue, have each filed common law counts
of invasion of privacy under the theory of public disclosure of private facts (Counts
Eleven and Twelve).
Id.
184. Tyne, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1339.
185. Joint Final Pretrial Statement at 15, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
186. Id. at 17.
187. Before substantive issues directly related to the invasion of privacy claims were argued
in the District Court case, preliminary matters of civil procedure were decided in Tyne v. Time
Warner Entm't Co., 212 F.R.D. 596 (M.D. Fla. 2002). The Plaintiffs sought the production of
documents that were identified by the studios as attorney-client privileged. Id. at 597. The court
eventually granted in part and denied in part the family's motion to compel documents. Id. at 601.
Those documents that were protected by privilege would not be produced, while the remainder
that was not protected would be produced. Id.
188. Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1344 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
189. Id. at 1340.
[24:247
2004] LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW 269
without their consent.' 90 Defendants argued that they did not violate section
540.08, since The Perfect Storm is an expressive work that has no
commercial advertising purpose; however, it was plaintiffs' contention (1)
that a commercial purpose existed by way of the marketing and distribution
of The Perfect Storm, and (2) that the film was not protected under the First
Amendment since it contained substantial material falsities or fictional
elements.19'
a. Commercial Purpose
The district court rejected the plaintiffs' "commercial purpose"
argument, finding that plaintiffs presented "no evidence showing that their
names and likenesses were used 'to directly promote' The Perfect
Storm. ''192 In the absence of such evidence of a direct promotion, plaintiffs
do not have a cause of action under section 540.08.193 Since its enactment,
every federal district court in Florida which has construed section 540.08
"has agreed that it applies only where a claimant's name or likeness is used
to directly promote a product or service."' 94 Furthermore, no court has ever
applied section 540.08 to "an expressive work, such as a film, a book, or a
song."'
95
In Loft v. Fuller,196 a case the district court found to be squarely on
point with Tyne, Florida defined the term "commercial purpose" as it
pertains to section 540.08.197 Decedent Robert Loft was a commercial pilot
on Eastern Airlines Flight 401 en route from New York to Miami when it
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1340-41.
192. Id. at 1342.
193. Tyne, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1342.
194. Appellees' Answer Brief at 3, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286 (11 th
Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13281); see, e.g., Epic Metals Corp. v. CONDEC, Inc. 867 F. Supp. 1009,
1016 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that section 540.08 "prevents the unauthorized use of a name or
personality to directly promote the product or service of the publisher"); NFL v. The Alley, Inc.,
624 F. Supp. 6, 10 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (holding that section 540.08 "prohibit[s] unconsented use of
an individual's name and likeness only when such directly promotes a commercial product or
service"); see also Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Dispositive Motion for
Summary Judgment at 8, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286 (11 th Cir. 2003) (No.
02-13281).
195. Appellees' Answer Brief at 3, Tyne (No. 02-13281). This approach is consistent with
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, which asserts that "[u]se of another's identity in a
novel, play, or motion picture is also not ordinarily an infringement." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (1995).
196. 408 So. 2d 619 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
197. Id. at 622-23.
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crashed into the Florida Everglades in 1972.198 For months following the
crash, the news media reported sightings of apparitions of Flight 401
crewmembers, including Loft.199 Subsequently, John Fuller wrote a non-
fictional account of both the crash and the reported poltergeists called The
Ghost of Flight 401.200 In 1978, Fuller's book was adapted into a motion
picture, just as Junger's bestseller has been.20 Loft's family filed an action
for unauthorized publication of Loft's name and likeness because the
movie represented Loft as a "reappearing ghost." 
202
In Loft, the court held that "[s]ection 540.08, by prohibiting the use of
one's name or likeness for trade, commercial or advertising purposes, is
designed to prevent the unauthorized use of a name to directly promote the
product or service of the publisher., 20 3 The term "commercial," as
employed in section 540.08, is not an absolute bar to the use of people's
names. 204 Rather, it protects individuals from the unauthorized use of their
names or likenesses solely in the context of advertisement or promotion.
While the film, like the book, was a "commercial" endeavor designed to
generate money, this fact in no way distinguished it "from almost all other
books, magazines or newspapers and simply does not amount to the kind of
commercial exploitation prohibited by the statute. 20 5 Therefore, the use of
the decedent's name in the publication of The Ghost of Flight 401 and the
production and distribution of the subsequent movie was not a direct
promotion of a product or service of the publisher under section 540.08.206
Applying the rationale of Loft to Tyne, the district court found that the
depiction of plaintiffs and their deceased family members did not constitute
an infringement of section 540.08.207 "Having determined that [the
plaintiffs'] names and likenesses were not used for trade, commercial, or
advertising purposes, the court need not extensively address the issue
[whether The Perfect Storm] falls within the [section] 540.08(3) exception
for publications 'having a current and legitimate public interest' .... 208
However, the court did note that motion pictures are entitled to complete
198. Id. at 620.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Loft, 408 So. 2d at 620; see also Tyne, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
203. Loft, 408 So. 2d at 622-23.
204. Id. at 623.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 622-23.
207. Tyne, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
208. See id. at 1342. See also infra Part V.C.
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protection under the First Amendment.0 9
b. Falsity
Plaintiffs' second argument involved a novel approach to overcoming
the ambiguous language of section 540.08. Although plaintiffs concede the
First Amendment embraces fictionalization, even with respect to motion
pictures, they nevertheless contend that protection is forfeited where the
work is passed off as truth instead of fiction or parody. 210 Both parties
agreed that Junger's book "contains no substantial or material falsity and
[therefore] enjoys complete protection under the First Amendment."
211
Plaintiffs, however, argued that the motion picture adaptation of The
Perfect Storm tells a different story, thus making it subject to publicity
rights liability.212 Since "[n]othing in the language of the disclaimer
suggests which characters or events 'were created for the purpose of
dramatization,"' the film gives the impression that it is a work of non-
fiction.213 Plaintiffs argued that, unlike Tyne, the defendants in Loft did not
allege any false statements about the deceased or fictionalize any portion of
the story.214 Since multiple legitimate media reports recounted Captain
Loft's alleged "reappearing ghost,, 215 "[t]he only thing 'false' in Loft was
the physiological impossibility that ghosts exist. ' 216 Still, the district court
held that even though The Perfect Storm contained fictionalized elements
while purporting itself to be "a true story," the plaintiffs' falsity argument
was completely meritless.217 Falsity is simply not an element of a right of
publicity cause of action.218
209. According to the Supreme Court "[t]hat books, newspapers, and magazines are
published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose
liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment. We fail to see why operation for profit should
have any different effect in the case of motion pictures." Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
501-02 (1952).
210. Appellants' Brief in Support of Appeal at 30-32, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co.,
336 F.3d 1286 (11 th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13281).
211. Appellants' Reply Brief at 10, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286 (1 1th
Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13281).
212. Id.
213. See id. at 12 n.2.
214. Id. at 18.
215. Loft, 408 So. 2d at 620.
216. Appellants' Reply Brief at 19, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
217. Tyne, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1342.
218. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 8:83 (criticizing the line of cases treating falsity as a
sufficient rebuttal to a First Amendment defense against a right-of-publicity claim, and observing
that "[flalsity should be relevant only to claims of defamation, false light invasion of privacy or
false advertising.").
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Other courts have also rejected plaintiffs' falsity argument. In
Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods,2t 9 the heirs of Rudolph Valentino
brought a right of publicity claim based on a fictional motion picture about
the silent-film star. The case held that "Valentino's heirs could not sustain a
right of publicity claim even if the movie was knowingly false and made
for financial gain., 220 Similarly, the plaintiff in Valentine v. CBS, Inc.
22 1
brought claims under section 540.08 for commercial misappropriation
based on the use of plaintiff's name in a Bob Dylan song.222 After engaging
in a thorough analysis of the song's accuracy in connection with plaintiffs
defamation claim, the court turned to the section 540.08 claim.223 Once
again, the court found that falsity was irrelevant and that the only issue
concerning section 540.08 was whether the plaintiffs name was used to
directly promote a product or service.224
Since Florida case law clearly did not support their falsity
argument,225 plaintiffs urged the district court to consider the right of
publicity laws of New York and California, which had rendered more
favorable decisions on this issue.226 As "centers for the publishing and
entertainment industries," these jurisdictions have developed the most
extensive right of publicity case law.227 Plaintiffs specifically encouraged
the district court to recast Florida law in the image of New York,228 where
219. 603 P.2d 454, 455 (Cal. 1979); See also Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support
of Their Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
220. Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Dispositive Motion for
Summary Judgment at 11, Tyne (No. 02-13281); see, e.g., Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F.
Supp. 331, 332-33 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd without opinion, 156 F.3d 1225 (3d Cir. 1998)
(regarding a right of publicity claim by Bobby Seale, one of the co-founders of the Black Panther
movement, for his portrayal in the docudrama Panther).
221. 698 F.2d 430, 431-32 (11 th Cir. 1983).
222. Id. at 431.
223. Id. at 433.
224. "[A]s a matter of law, the ballad 'Hurricane' did not commercially exploit [the
plaintiff's name, since] defendants did not use her name to directly promote a product or service."
Valentine, 698 F.2d at 433.
225. Section 540.08 includes no references to "falsehood," "fictionalization," "falsity,"
"truth," or "non-fiction."
226. See Appellants' Reply Brief at 23, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
227. Id.
228. Appellants Brief in Support of Appeal at 39, Tyne (No. 02-13281). Plaintiffs argue that
it is well-settled that when the legislature of a state has used a statute of another
state or country as a guide for the preparation and enactment of a statute, the courts
of the adopting state will usually adopt the construction placed on the statute in the
jurisdiction of its inception.
Id. at 39 (citing Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 272 P.2d 177, 180 (Utah,
1954)); see also Crance Co. v. Richardson Constr. Co., 312 F.2d 269, 270 (5th Cir. 1963)
(applying New York court's construction to Florida corporation law, patterned after New York
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"cases suggest that falsity is an element of a 'commercial misappropriation'
claim and suggest that it is not necessary to prove that a claimant's name or
likeness was used to 'directly promote' a product or service. 2 29 Rejecting
this argument, the district court noted that plaintiffs had made their request
because "the weight of Florida authority [was] against them., 230 Florida's
right of publicity law is "well-settled and unambiguous"-falsity is not an
231issue.
2. False Light Invasion of Privacy
The district court also found that Billy Tyne's children did not have
standing to bring an action for false light invasion of privacy on their
deceased father's behalf.232 A cause of action for false light invasion of
privacy is "strictly personal and may be asserted only by the person who is
the subject of the challenged publication., 233 Relatives of a deceased person
have no such cause of action "regardless of how close [their] personal
relationship was with the deceased.,
234
The only exception under the common law occurs when "plaintiffs
experience an independent violation of their own personal privacy rights
other than the violation alleged to have occurred indirectly by virtue of the
publicity given to the deceased. '235 Both Erica and Billie-Jo Tyne argued
that they "experienced an independent violation of their own personal
privacy rights by having been individually depicted in the Picture."
236
Although both plaintiffs appeared as characters in the film, neither
character spoke any lines at any point in the motion picture. 237 The
actresses portraying them were shown in a photograph in the wheelhouse of
the Andrea Gail and were also shown attending their father's memorial
service. 238 Both Erica and Billie-Jo disclosed that their father kept a
photograph in the wheelhouse of the vessel and that they did in fact attend
law).
229. Appellees' Answer Brief at 28-29, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
230. Tyne, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1342 n.1.
231. Id. Nothing in Loft, Valentine, or any other Florida court decision interpreting section
540.08 indicates [a willingness] by Florida courts . . . to adopt New York's analysis of
commercial misappropriation claims. Appellees' Answer Brief at 29, Tyne (No. 02-1328 1).
232. Tyne, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1343.
233. Loft, 408 So. 2d at 621.
234. Id.
235. Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So. 2d 683, 689 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
236. Tyne, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1343.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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the memorial service. 239 Hence, "the Picture cannot be said to have
portrayed Erica and Billie-Jo in a false light because they have admitted to
the factual accuracy of the scenes depicting them., 240 Furthermore, the
portrayal was "not sufficiently egregious in nature to establish a claim of
invasion of privacy against Defendants. 241 Since the plaintiffs did not
provide any evidence of an independent violation of their own privacy
rights, they could not maintain a relational cause of action based on the
invasion of their father's privacy.
3. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
Plaintiffs Debra Tigue and Dale R. Murphy, Jr. asserted claims for
invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private facts, alleging that The
Perfect Storm falsely portrayed them as living in Massachusetts.
242
Plaintiffs further contended that the film's depiction of Debra as being
intimately involved with another man is entirely fabricated in knowing or
reckless disregard of the truth.243
The Florida Supreme Court has adopted the Restatement (Second) of
Torts' definition of invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private
facts.244 Thus, the district court did not find it necessary to address the
defendants' assertion that the details of plaintiffs' lives are of no concern to
the public because an essential element of the tort of public disclosure of
private facts under Florida law is that the facts at issue must be true.245 In a
situation where the facts disclosed in a publication "are false, the interest
invaded is that protected by the defamation and false-light torts: the interest
in being represented truthfully to the world., 246 By basing their right of
publicity cause of action on the "falsity" of the acts portrayed in the film,
plaintiffs abrogated a key element in their public disclosure of private facts
cause of action.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Tyne, 204 F. Supp. at 1343.
243. Id. at 1343-44.
244. See supra Part II.D.2.
245. Leidholdt v. L.F.P., Inc., 860 F.2d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS, special note to § 652D (1976).
246. Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1230 (7th Cir. 1993). See supra Part
IV.A. 1 .b.
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B. Round #2-Eleventh Circuit Decision
Plaintiffs appealed the district court's summary judgment in favor of
Warner to the Eleventh Circuit.2 47 The public disclosure of private facts
claim was not challenged on appeal.248  However, the commercial
misappropriation and false light invasion of privacy claims were
appealed.24 9 On July 9, 2003, the Eleventh Circuit found in favor of Warner
as to the false light invasion of privacy claim, but certified a question of
law regarding the commercial misappropriation claim to the Florida
Supreme Court.
250
1. Right of Publicity
In their Eleventh Circuit appeal, plaintiffs continued to maintain that
the First Amendment does not protect The Perfect Storm's portrayal
because it contained falsities.251 They also offered an innovative and
initially persuasive statutory interpretation argument 2
a. Falsity
Plaintiffs argued that by failing to acknowledge the constitutional
distinction between avowed fiction and fiction which is falsely packaged as
true, "Warner betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of protected speech
and ignores the long line of Supreme Court cases which hold that culpable
falsehood does not enjoy First Amendment protection. 2 53 Here again,
plaintiffs distinguished their case from Loft, asserting that newspaper
reports existed regarding Loft's reappearances on other flights, but the
"depiction of the events at sea, and the relationships between the crew
247. See generally Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1286.
248. Appellees' Answer Brief at 6, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
249. Id. at 6-7.
250. See Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1291-92.
251. Id. at 1292.
252. Douglas E. Mirell, Worming Around The First Amendment: An Overview of Recent
Developments in Publicity Rights Litigation, Address to the Los Angeles Copyright Society (Oct.
1, 2003) (expressing the view that these arguments could have been nullified had the Florida
Legislature included a specific motion picture exception in the "messy" statute). Several states
with publicity rights statutes, including California, Illinois, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, and
Washington, explicitly exempt from liability expressive audiovisual works, such as the work at
issue here, as well as the attendant advertising of such works. Amicus Curiae Brief of The Motion
Picture Association of America, Inc., et al. at 15, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d
1286 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13281).
253. Appellants' Reply Brief at 5, Tyne (No. 02-13281) (citing The Florida Star v. B.J.F.,
491 U.S. 524, 530 n.5 (1989)).
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members and their children, had never been reported in the press and were
intentionally fabricated., 254 Even though courts throughout the country
(including the Supreme Court in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad
Co.,255 the Eleventh Circuit in Valentine, and the Florida Court of Appeals
in Loft) have rejected the falsity argument on which plaintiffs rely,2 56 the
Eleventh Circuit nevertheless certified the falsity question to the Florida
Supreme Court. 57
b. Statutory Interpretation
On appeal, in addition to their falsity argument, plaintiffs added a
compelling statutory construction argument. Florida's commercial
misappropriation statute employs the phrase "any commercial or
advertising purpose., 258 Plaintiffs contend that if the terms advertising and
commercial are both read to refer to the promotion of a product or service,
that constitutes surplusage. 9 Plaintiffs argue that the district court's
interpretation of these terms is too restrictive. 260 By requiring a finding of
direct product endorsement, the court ignores the term "commercial
purpose" as being distinct from "advertising purpose., 26 1 According to the
plaintiffs, this violates the well-known principle that "a statute should be
read to give effect to each of its provisions and to avoid rendering any
terms mere surplusage.
' 262
Plaintiffs likewise argued that if section 540.08 "were read solely to
prevent the unauthorized use of a name to directly promote the product or
service ... it would conflict with language in the statute's two 'exception'
provisions. 263  Section 540.08(3)(a) states that commercial
misappropriation "does not apply to the use of a person's name or likeness
in news or other media if the use implicates public interest and is not for an
advertising purpose. 52 64 However, if section 540.08(1) exclusively applies
254. Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1290.
255. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
256. Appellees' Answer Brief at 37, Tyne (No. 02-1328 1).
257. Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1291.
258. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(1) (West Supp. 2001).
259. Appellants' Brief in Support of Appeal at 43-44, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
260. See id. at 48.
261. Id. at 45-46 n.19.
262. Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1291. "It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that
significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if
possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage." Id. (citing
Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. 840 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003)).
263. Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1291.
264. Id. For purposes of deciphering the perplexing statute, the Eleventh Circuit phrases
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to advertising or promotional purposes, then section 540.08(3)(a) becomes
unnecessary to limit the statute's applicability. 265 Essentially, plaintiffs
argued that if the statute only prohibits product endorsement, "there would
be no need for a newsworthiness exemption or a defense predicated on the
same."2 66 Therefore, a "narrow interpretation of 'commercial purpose' to
mean nothing more than 'advertising purpose' renders the newsworthy
interest exemption in the statute entirely superfluous. 267
Under the same rationale, the second artistic works exemption would
similarly be rendered superfluous if Florida's misappropriation statute is
interpreted to only cover uses that directly promote a product or service. 68
According to plaintiffs, it makes little sense for section 540.08(3)(b) to
exempt the resale of artistic works if section 540.08(1) applies solely to
advertisements. 69
Plaintiffs' final statutory construction argument is that section 540.08,
by its express terms, applies to any natural person, including any person
deceased within the past forty years.270 It would therefore be inconsistent if
the statute were limited to a kind of injury likely to be experienced only by
celebrities, which make up an extremely small fraction of the population.271
The Eleventh Circuit failed to address this argument.
The ambiguities of section 540.08 left the Eleventh Circuit with little
choice but to certify the following question of law to the Florida Supreme
Court: "To what extent does Section 540.08 of the Florida Statutes apply to
the facts of this case?
2 7 2
2. False Light Invasion of Privacy
Plaintiffs conceded that "false light invasion of privacy claims are
section 540.08(3)(a) positively: "the statute continues to apply to (i.e. consent is required for) the
use of a person's name or likeness in news or public interest settings that involve advertising." Id.
265. See id.
266. Appellants' Reply Brief at 8, Tyne (No. 02-1328 1).
267. Appellants' Brief in Support of Appeal at 43-44, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
268. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West Supp. 2001). This provision states that commercial
misappropriation does not apply to the use of a person's name or likeness to resell or redistribute
artistic works if the individual consented to the initial sale or distribution of the product. Id.
269. See Appellants' Brief in Support of Appeal at 44, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
270. § 540.08(4). This statute has no requirement that the plaintiff establish his celebrity or
that his name or likeness had commercial value at the time of injury as seen in other jurisdictions.
Id.; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(h) (Deering 1999).
271. See Appellants' Reply Brief at 16 n.4, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
272. Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1291. "Substantial doubt about a question of state law upon which a
particular case turns should be resolved by certifying the question to the state supreme court."
Jones v. Dillard's, Inc., 331 F.3d 1259, 1268 (11th Cir. 2003).
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generally non-descendible;. [however, they argued] that the district court
erred in failing to recognize [a] . . . 'relational' right of privacy.',
273
Plaintiffs' argument is premised upon the personal invasion of privacy they
themselves allegedly experienced when The Perfect Storm "vilified their
father [Billy Tyne] as an 'obsessed boat captain' ' 274 and portrayed his
relationship with them as estranged.275 Florida courts have established that
under unusual circumstances a defendant's conduct toward a decedent may
be sufficiently egregious to maintain an independent cause of action.276 The
underlying principle behind the descendibility exception "is that the
relatives of the deceased have their own privacy interest in protecting their
rights in the character and memory of the deceased as well as the right to
recover for their own humiliation and wounded feelings caused by the
publication. '" 277 Such relatives carry a "heavy burden" because no reported
Florida case has ever permitted such a claim.278 Tyne's daughters argued
that they should be permitted to bring their own false light claims based on
Billy Tyne's portrayal, "even though the Picture barely depicts them, gives
them no dialogue, does not identify them by name, does not identify them
in its end credits, and is admittedly accurate in its portrayal of them."
279
Defendants countered that these claims were "nothing more than a 'hook'
to drag before the court the alleged defamation of a deceased person, Billy
Tyne. ,28°
The Eleventh Circuit concurred with the district court that the film's
portrayal of Billy Tyne, although possibly disingenuous, did not meet the
threshold of egregiousness 281 and thus did not warrant invocation of the
relational right of privacy.282
273. See Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1292.
274. Id.
275. See Appellants' Reply Brief at 25, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
276. See Loft, 408 So. 2d at 624.
277. Id. See Williams, 575 So. 2d at 689.
278. Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Dispositive Motion for
Summary Judgment at 23-24 n.9, Tyne (No. 02-1328 1).
279. Appellees' Answer Brief at 15, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
280. Id.
281. See Williams, 575 So. 2d at 690 (finding that "the display of grotesque pictures of a
deceased's body" was precisely the sort of "egregious situations envisioned in Loft," but refusing
to reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment based on a "limited display of the
videotape and the photographs").
282. Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1292. The court did not find that the Florida courts intended to
extend the relational right of privacy exception to depictions that are "merely inaccurate or
dramatized." Id. at 1293. The Loft court reached a similar conclusion, where the decedent's
portrayal as a ghost was not sufficiently egregious in nature to establish a claim of relational right
of privacy. See Loft, 408 So. 2d at 625.
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V. WHY THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THE
QUESTION OF LAW IN WARNER'S FAVOR
The section 540.08 claim is currently in the hands of the Florida
Supreme Court. The seven Justices of the Florida Supreme Court heard
very different interpretations of section 540.08 on February 4, 2004.83
Attorney Gregg Thomas summarized Warner's argument, explaining that
"a Chevrolet does not have a First Amendment right. A book does. A
movie does. Music does .... We're entitled by the First Amendment to do
fictional works of history. 2 84 On the other hand, the Tyne attorney,
Stephen Calvacca, countered that "when you sensationalize someone's life
... to increase your profit, that's the ultimate wrong... [a]nd [Plaintiffs]
want simply recognition that Warner made a mistake. 2 85 The following
analysis asserts that the Florida Supreme Court is constitutionally obligated
to find that the scope of the right of publicity does not extend to the
plaintiffs in Tyne.
First Amendment considerations "are no less relevant whether the
work in question is fictional,286 non-fictional287 or a combination of the two
[docudramas], 288 like The Perfect Storm, "since all such expressive works
merit full constitutional protection. '28 9 Defendants accurately described
The Perfect Storm as a movie "based on a true story;" however, such
disclaimers are not even necessary to defeat a publicity rights claim in a
docudrama. 290 The viewing public is savvy enough to understand that
283. See Marc Caputo, Film's Take on Captain Stirs a Tempest, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 5,
2004), at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/state/7876429.htm (last visited Feb. 16,
2004).
284. Id.
285. David Royse, Captain's Kin: 'Perfect Storm' Hyped as True, but Wasn't Quiet,
NAPLES DAILY NEWS (Feb. 5, 2004), at http://www.naplesnews.com/npdn/cda/article-
print/I, 1983,NPDN_14910_2630373.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
286. The First Amendment protects the depiction of real persons in fictional stories as seen
in Rogers and Polydoros. See supra Part II.C.3. "In most cases, the implied rationale is that the
work is protected not because it is fictional, but because it is an expressive work, notwithstanding
that it is fictional." Schuyler M. Moore, Sex, Lies, and Videotape; The First Amendment vs. The
Right of Publicity for Expressive Works, 25 ENT. LAW REP. (2003).
287. Ruffin-Steinback v. DePasse, 82 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (E.D. Mich. 2000). The First
Amendment also protects the depiction of real persons in non-fiction accounts, recognizing an
exception for uses in "news" and any "presentation having a current and legitimate public
interest." Id.
288. Id. at 730. Docudramas, works that blend non-fiction and fiction, are entitled to
"substantial latitude" under the First Amendment. See Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1154
(9th Cir. 1995) (protecting a book and movie dramatizing real events).
289. Amicus Curiae Brief of The Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., et al. at 1,
Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286 (11 th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13281).
290. Id. at 12.
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dramatized expressive works obviously mix fact and fiction.291 Construing
section 540.08 in a manner consistent with the First Amendment is crucial.
Achieving this fundamental objective can be reached in one of two ways:
(1) by concurring with Loft that the use of "real" persons' names in
expressive mediums does not amount to trade, commercial, or advertising
use;292 or (2) by holding that even if section 540.08 does apply to
expressive works, The Perfect Storm is exempt under the section
540.08(3)(a) since it is newsworthy and has "a current and legitimate
public interest., 293 Although the second approach addresses the statutory
interpretation issue raised by the plaintiffs, it might create problems for
more obscure stories. "An unfortunate consequence of [applying] the
newsworthiness defense" is an inappropriate focus on the "truth" or
"falsity" of a portrayal, despite the fact that "truth or falsity should be
considered only in the context of a defamation or false light invasion of
privacy claim, and is irrelevant to a right of publicity.. . claim., 294 Ideally,
the Loft approach is a more sound way to construe section 540.08 in a
manner consistent with the First Amendment.
A. Falsity Revisited
In support of their falsity argument, plaintiffs rely upon two cases,
Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Globe Int'l Publ'g, Inc. 295 and Messenger v.
Gruner + Jahr USA Publ 'g.296 Peoples Bank asserts that the test for
liability "is not whether the story is or is not characterized as 'fiction,'
'humor,' or anything else in the publication, but whether the charged
portions in context could be reasonably understood as describing actual
facts about the plaintiff or actual events in which [the plaintiff]
participated., 297 However, Peoples Bank concerned a newspaper that was
found liable for "false light invasion of privacy and outrage (intentional
infliction of emotional distress)" for depicting plaintiff by name as a
ninety-seven year old pregnant woman who was forced to quit her job;
298
291. See Partington, 56 F.3d at 1154-55.
292. See Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619, 622-23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
293. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(3)(a) (West Supp. 2001).
294. Dougherty, supra note 104, at 6 n.32.
295. 978 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1992).
296. 994 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (certifying questions to, 727 N.E.2d 549 (N.Y.
2000)).
297. Peoples Bank, 978 F.2d at 1068-69.
298. Id. at 1067. The Eighth Circuit held that the readers could rationally believe that the
story was factually based and such undisclosed fictionalization "is the kind of calculated
falsehood against which the First Amendment can tolerate sanctions without significant
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this is "inapposite because it did not involve a 'publicity rights claim.,
299
Similarly, plaintiffs rely on Messenger for the proposition that section
540.08 provides relief for culpably false or fictionalized publications, even
on matters of public interest. 300 The plaintiff in Messenger sued the
publisher for the unauthorized use of her photograph in connection with an
article that created the false impression that the plaintiff had engaged in
certain described sexual conduct.30 1 Messenger distinguished itself from
both Loft and Valentine30 2 by noting that neither of those cases involved
reckless falsity.303  However, even assuming that the New York
misappropriation statute applied in Messenger mirrors section 540.08,
plaintiffs reliance on the decision should be "given no weight because that
ruling was reversed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals."
3°4
Plaintiffs have failed to present any case law to firmly suggest that
falsity is an element of a section 540.08 claim. Expressive works of any
kind, whether documentary films or biopics, will inevitably have fictional
elements, or "falsity. 30 5 Defendants assert that in order to meet plaintiffs'
interpretation of the statute, producers would be required to include "icons
bearing the words 'fact' and 'fiction' [which] would constantly appear as
audiences tried, in vain, to enjoy the movie. 30 6 Worse yet, producers
would be required to obtain consent from every real person portrayed in an
expressive work, thereby giving "censorship power to the subjects of those
works and accordingly create the very chilling effect which the First
Amendment is designed to prevent."
3°7
B. Statutory Interpretation Revisited
Plaintiffs' statutory interpretation arguments present the Florida
Supreme Court with a far more challenging and credible contention. The
Eleventh Circuit decision noted that the use of three separate terms set out
impairment of its function." Id. at 1070.
299. Amicus Curiae Brief of The Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., et al. at 11
n.6, Tyne (No. 02-1328 1).
300. Appellants' Brief in Support of Appeal at 37, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336
F.3d 1286 (11 th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13281).
301. Messenger, 994 F. Supp. at 526.
302. Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d 430 (1 lth Cir. 1983).
303. Messenger, 994 F. Supp. at 531.
304. Amicus Curiae Brief of The Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., et al. at 17
n. 11, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
305. Defendants'/Respondents' Answer Brief at 23, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336
F.3d 1286 (1 th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13281).
306. Id. at 30.
307. Id. at 23.
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in the disjunctive ("trade," "commercial," or "advertising") is a strong
argument for distinctive applications of the terms in order to avoid
surplusage or redundancy.3 °8 Defendants argue that, under Loft, all three
terms are in fact redundant since they all "seek to limit the unconsented use
of names and likenesses in direct connection with the promotion of a
product or service., 30 9 Defendants cite three examples of "improper
commercial exploitation of an individual's name or likeness [that would be
prohibited under the Loft interpretation] without violating the First
Amendment."
310
The Eleventh Circuit decision also noted that the exceptions built into
the statute311 suggest a broader interpretation of section 540.08 than mere
product endorsement.312 If only depictions which have an "advertising
purpose," as Warner suggests, are prohibited by section 540.08, "not only
would there be little need for a newsworthy exemption as a practical
matter, but the application of the exemption would be negated by the very
advertising purpose which implicates the statute." 313 Likewise, there would
be no need for the statute's second exemption "regarding the resale of
literary, musical, or artistic productions where the initial sale has been
authorized if, in fact, the only prohibited commercial purpose is direct
308. See supra Part IV.B.I.b.
309. Defendants'/Respondents' Answer Brief at 34, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
310. Id. at 13.
Advertisements or Commercials. If a seller of automobiles uses a photograph of
deceased racecar driver Dale Earnhardt in an advertisement for the seller's
automobiles, that use would violate Section 540.08 because it is an unauthorized
use that promotes the seller's products. Such a prohibition is constitutionally sound.
Placement of a Name on a Product. If the Nike Corporation, without permission,
sells a basketball shoe called the 'Shaquille O'Neal Sneaker,' such use of Shaquille
O'Neal's name violates Section 540.08. Even if the name is not used in
advertisements themselves, its placement on the product promotes the product and
therefore violates the statute. This construction of Section 540.08 would not violate
the constitution. Use of a Photograph on a Product. If a photographer takes a
picture of a baby, without authorization from the baby's parents, and that picture is
used by Gerber on a jar of baby food, the use violates Section 540.08. While there
may not be an advertisement involved, the use of the baby's picture on the jar of
baby food plainly has the purpose of inducing (i.e., promoting) sales of the baby
food.
Id. at 13 n.9. These examples illustrate that Loft's reading of section 540.08 is broader than
plaintiffs suggest.
311. See § 540.08(3)(a); § 540.08(3)(b).
312. Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286,1291 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
312. Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1288.
313. Movants' Initial Brief on Question Certified By The Eleventh Circuit at 29, Tyne v.
Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286 (11 th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13281).
313. Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1288.
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product endorsement. 31 4 Furthermore, films are not specifically identified
as works that are subject to either of the exceptions spelled out under
section 540.08.315
Although the exceptions are certainly contentious and highly
debatable, they appear to have been drafted for a crucial reason, "to make
doubly certain that protected First Amendment speech never falls within
the scope of the statute. 31 6 Ever since Loft and Valentine narrowly
interpreted section 540.08, "the Florida Legislature never has attempted to
alter or amend the statute. '317 The Florida Supreme Court has declared that
"[l]ong-term legislative inaction after a court construes a statute amounts to
legislative acceptance or approval of that judicial construction. '318 If the
Loft or Valentine reading of section 540.08 had rendered the exceptions
redundant, the Florida Legislature had over two decades to rectify the
problem by amending the statute.319
While plaintiffs' statutory arguments are initially compelling, a long
line of Florida Supreme Court cases have established the cardinal rule "that
a statute be construed in such a way so as to effectuate legislative intent
and that all doubts as to the validity of a statute should be resolved in favor
of its constitutionality. 3 20 Since statutes should be construed so as to avoid
constitutional infirmities, the Florida Supreme Court is required to adopt
the Loft construction of section 540.08 to prevent any collision with the
First Amendment.
Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court has also held that
"[c]onstruction of a statute which would lead to an absurd result should be
avoided.",321 Under plaintiffs' interpretation of section 540.08, the statute
would require filmmakers to obtain permission from every living person
and from the descendants of every deceased person with any connection to
a fictionalized historical account or life story. This is simply not feasible
and commercially absurd.
314. Id. at 30.
315. See § 540.08(3)(a); § 540.08(3)(b).
316. Defendants'/Respondents' Answer Brief at 40, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
317. Id. at 37-38.
318. Goldenberg v. Sawczak, 791 So. 2d 1078, 1081 (Fla. 2001).
319. See Defendants'/Respondents' Answer Brief at 42, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
320. McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So. 2d 48, 51 (Fla. 1974) (citing State v. Dinsmore, 308 So.
2d 32, 38 (Fla. 1975); City of St. Petersburg v. Siebold, 48 So. 2d 291, 294 (Fla. 1950); State ex
rel. Shevin v. Metz Constr. Co., Inc., 285 So. 2d 598, 600 (Fla. 1973); Florida Jai Alai, Inc. v.
Lake Howell Water and Reclamation Dist., 274 So. 2d 522, 524 (Fla. 1973); Tomillo v. Miami
Herald Publ'g Co., 287 So. 2d 78, 85 (Fla. 1973)).
321. McKibben, 293 So.2d at 51 (citing City of Miami v. Romfh, 63 So. 440, 442 (Fla.
1913); State v. Willis, 124 So.2d 48, 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960)).
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In Hershey v. City of Clearwater,322 the Eleventh Circuit followed
both of these fundamental rules of statutory construction of Florida law.323
However, the same court ignored these rules in Tyne.324 Although the
plaintiffs' statutory arguments are compelling, the Florida Supreme Court
should find that their interpretation of section 540.08 would result in an
unconstitutional and absurd form of censorship.
In order to uphold the First Amendment and support freedom of
expression, the Florida Supreme Court should take the advice of the
Motion Picture Association of America in its Amicus Brief and adopt the
following bright-line rule: "Section 540.08 applies only to the direct
commercial misappropriation of a person's name or likeness for advertising
or promotional purposes, and does not apply to the use of such indicia of
personality in any expressive works that recount or dramatize real
events. 325
C. Newsworthiness, Public Interest and The First Amendment
Even if the Florida Supreme Court does find that section 540.08
applies to expressive works, The Perfect Storm should still be exempt
under section 540.08(3)(a), since it is both newsworthy and of public
interest. Given that The Perfect Storm depicts a highly publicized event
with massive media coverage, it falls within the newsworthiness
exemption. However, plaintiffs not only assert the statutory interpretation
arguments discussed in the prior section,326 but they also maintain that
falsity vitiates the newsworthiness exception. 327 This interpretation would
subject entire bodies of everyday speech, ranging from news reports to
political cartoons, to ongoing litigation. Rarely do newspaper columns or
editorials contain an express warning of "avowed fiction., 328 "Instead, the
publisher almost always relies on the protections for hyperbole and opinion
that are well established in the law of defamation and false light., 329 Under
plaintiffs' interpretation of section 540.08, an exaggerated or opinionated
322. 834 F.2d 937 (1 1th Cir. 1987).
323. Id. at 940.
324. See Tyne, 336 F.3d at 1291.
325. Amicus Curiae Brief of The Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., et al. at 3,
Tyne (No. 02-13281).
326. See supra Part V.B.
327. See Movants' Initial Brief on Question Certified By The Eleventh Circuit at 20, Tyne
(No. 02-13281).
328. Amici Curiae of Florida Media Organizations at 11, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co.,
336 F.3d 1286 (11 th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13281).
329. Id.
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news report would be comparable to a docudrama, and thus "be actionable
under section 540.08 because it would be published for a profit, it would
contain false facts [no matter how minimal] ... and it would use the name
or likeness of an individual without consent. '330 The judicial branch would
no longer be neutral in the marketplace of ideas; courts would be forced to
act as legislators and literary critics. 33' Fortunately, the Loft construction
protects fictionalizations and avoids unnecessary conflicts between the
newsworthiness exemption and the First Amendment.332
Plaintiffs also attempt to inject falsity into the public interest
exemption. Plaintiffs do not try to challenge the public interest in the story,
since "[i]t is beyond dispute that the public has a current and legitimate
interest in the events surrounding the October 1991 storm and the fate of
the Andrea Gail."' 333 Rather, plaintiffs assert that Warner's section
540.08(3)(a) claim is invalid because the picture contained falsehoods.334
However, "[t]he Supreme Court has frequently affirmed that speech on
public issues occupies the 'highest rung on the hierarchy of First
Amendment values,' and is entitled to special protection., 335 Since it is
well established that the public interest exemption applies to expressive
works like songs and films as well as news reports,336 applying the
exemption to The Perfect Storm seems appropriate.
Plaintiffs' interpretation of section 540.08(3)(a) is unreasonable
because it would force journalists and filmmakers to acquire consent not
simply from each character central to the story, which would be
unnecessary in and of itself, but also from every person even minutely
involved in the story. Where separate characters maintain different
accounts of a newsworthy event, the article could not be written, nor could
the film be produced, without necessarily incorporating some fictional
elements. Under the plaintiffs' construction of section 540.08(3)(a) many
well-established and clearly protected forms of expression would be
endangered, including "the unauthorized use of a real person's name or
likeness in television programs, historical fiction, textbooks, plays, poems,
songs, fine artworks, and movies.., so long as they contain any element of
330. Id.
331. Id. at 20.
332. See id.
333. Defendants'/Respondents' Answer Brief at 21, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
334. Movants' Reply Brief at 6 n.2, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286 (1 1th
Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13281).
335. Defendants'/Respondents' Answer Brief at 19-20, Tyne (No. 02-13281) (citing
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)).
336. See, e.g., Valentine, 698 F.2d at 432-33.
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fiction or falsity whatsoever."337 In its Answer Brief to the Florida Supreme
Court, Warner lists several well-known docudramas based on books,
including A Civil Action (1998, based on Jonathan Harr's "A Civil Action")
and Raging Bull (1980, based on boxer Jake LaMotta's "Raging Bull: My
Story"), in order to illustrate the chilling effect that plaintiffs' reading of
section 540.08 would have on motion pictures. 338 Asking filmmakers to
demonstrate that detailed biopics, such as A Civil Action and Raging Bull,
"are not in any respects [fictionalized] or dramatized, or that every specific
incident of fictionalization has been fully disclosed, 339 would essentially
prohibit the production of such films. Failing to protect partially dramatized
or fictionalized stories about events that are newsworthy and that have
public interest would defy the First Amendment and render section
540.08(3)(a) inconsequential.34 °
D. Disguised Defamation
Plaintiffs' section 540.08 claims are post-mortem defamation
claims34 1 camouflaged as commercial misappropriation claims. Fiction and
dramas based on true events, like The Perfect Storm, are perceived as
"cloudy and muddled" since "courts have often mixed publicity rights
together with other torts, such as defamation and false light., 342 Even if an
expressive work is protected by the First Amendment from a right of
publicity claim, filmmakers "may still be liable under another claim, such
as defamation or false light, for the use of an image in a falsified
manner." 343 Plaintiffs argue that under the Loft interpretation of section
540.08, stories could be maliciously "sensationalized, embellished,
distorted and ... fabricated, yet marketed as 'true' ... for the purpose of
337. Defendants'/Respondents' Answer Brief at 43, Tyne (No. 02-13281) (categorizing
three forms of expression that would violate the statute under Plaintiffs' reading: movies based on
historical events or books, sketch comedy, and unauthorized biography).
338. See id. at 44 n.37.
339. Id. at 43 n.36.
340. See id. at 44-45.
341. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
To create liability for defamation there must be: (a) a false and defamatory
statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c)
fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) either
actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special
harm caused by the publication.
Id.
342. Hunt, supra note 17, at 1634.
343. Id. at 1635.
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achieving greater dramatic appeal and commercial success. 344 However,
the cause of action for this wrong is defamation, not right of publicity, and
courts have developed other limitations on defamation claims to reflect
First Amendment concerns.345 Plaintiffs should not be permitted to avoid
those limitations by phrasing their claims under the guise of the right of
publicity.
3 46
Since plaintiffs maintain that Warner maliciously depicted the
fishermen and their families in a false light, "it would be reasonable to
assume that Plaintiffs were pursuing a defamation claim against Warner
Bros. But they are not doing so, at least not on the surface, likely in
recognition of the fact that a defamation claim cannot be brought on behalf
of the deceased., 347 Plaintiffs have always asserted that The Perfect Storm
falsely portrayed decedents and plaintiffs with actual malice.348 These
allegations might state a valid claim for defamation if decedents were still
alive and if their portrayal was proved to be harmful to their reputation,349
but these allegations do not state a claim under section 540.08, the text of
which includes neither "falsity" nor "malice. 350 Furthermore, had the
decedents portrayed in the film lived, Warner would have had the
opportunity to determine the true events of their voyage aboard the Andrea
Gail, thereby avoiding a future defamation claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Florida Supreme Court should apply the Loft interpretation of
section 540.08, thereby upholding the First Amendment and protection of
expressive works. A ruling in plaintiffs' favor would not only be an
unconstitutional interpretation of section 540.08, but it would also turn
Florida "into a magnet for misappropriation litigation and a pariah for the
distribution and sale of expressive works."351 If the plaintiffs were to
344. Appellants' Reply Brief at 16, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286 (11 th
Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13281).
345. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52-53 (1998).
346. See id.
347. Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Dispositive Motion for
Summary Judgment at 4, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286 (11 th Cir. 2003) (No.
02-13281); see, e.g., Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 591 n.6 (1978); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 560 cmt. a (1977).
348. Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Dispositive Motion for
Summary Judgment at 4, Tyne (No. 02-13281);
349. Defendants'/Respondents' Answer Brief at 2, Tyne (No. 02-13281).
350. Id.
351. Amicus Curiae Brief of The Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., et al. at 19,
Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286 (lth Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13281).
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prevail under section 540.08, the statute would require filmmakers to
obtain permission of every living person and all of the descendants of every
deceased person who had any connection to any historical event or life
story that is depicted in a motion picture. Not only would this imbue
multiple individuals with the right to censor and control works protected by
the First Amendment, but it would also prevent many notable stories from
being expressed in film. 352 Fortunately, the First Amendment guarantees
that filmmakers do not have to make the "Draconian choice" of either
confining "their story to documented facts, [setting] their story in a wholly
mythological world, or [submitting] to the censorship, and pecuniary
demands of real-life characters and/or their heirs. 353
Plaintiffs continue to contend that Warner could have relied solely on
Junger's bestseller, "changed the names of the persons portrayed and the
vessel they sailed on," or they could have waited forty years until the
statutory right to sue under section 540.08(4) expires.354 However, these
options do not chill the First Amendment, they freeze it.355 By relying only
on Junger's work, the part of the film which is most newsworthy and of the
most public interest, the demise of the fishing boat and her crew, could not
be included. Because the Andrea Gail was lost at sea, there is no way the
story of this ill-fated voyage could be told without fictionalizing it.
Furthermore, changing names or waiting for the statutory period to end
would strike at the very core of the First Amendment and would also
deprive Warner of its rights under the newsworthiness and public interest
exemptions of section 540.08(3)(a). Unless section 540.08 is read to
maximize the First Amendment under the Loft interpretation (as was done
by the district court in Tyne), any motion picture or other expressive work
that involves the unauthorized depiction of real persons would be exposed
352. See Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Dispositive Motion for
Summary Judgment at 2, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286 (1lth Cir. 2003) (No.
02-13281). Threats of expensive and protracted right of publicity litigation have already forced
most publishers and film companies to rely on the mantra 'When in doubt, leave it out,' resulting
in a real hit to the First Amendment." Schuyler M. Moore, Sex, Lies, and Videotape; The First
Amendment vs. The Right of Publicity for Expressive Works, 25 ENT. LAW REP. (2003).
353. Amicus Curiae Brief of The Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., et al. at 2,
Tyne (No. 02-13281).
354. Amicus Brief on Behalf of the Entertainment, Arts and Sports Law Section of the
Florida Bar at 22, Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 336 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-
13281).
355. Under this theory, a film on the White House scandals behind the Clinton presidency
could only be told either (1) by relying solely on a non-fiction book and acquiring consent from
each and every person involved in the book's account, (2) by changing the names of the
characters (which would be preposterous), or (3) by waiting forty years after the death of Clinton
and presumably anyone involved in any scandal portrayed in the film.
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to liability. It is imperative that the Florida Supreme Court realize that
"such a result would not only chill creative expression within this State, but
would have profound nationwide-indeed global-ramifications on all
such expressive works."
356
Jordan Tabach-Bank*
356. Amicus Curiae Brief of The Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., et al. at 1,
Tyne (No. 02-13281).
*This Note is dedicated to my mom, who will always be my rock, my provider, my hero,
and most importantly my best friend. Your generosity, humor, intellect, strength, kindness, and
love have made me the person that I am today. I can only hope that I will one day be half the
parent to my children that you and dad have been to Lauren and me. We love you, and we will
always be with you.

